Last summer, I wrote about how both the United States and China were pushing for autarky (self-sufficiency), trying to uncouple their economies from one another after decades of entanglement. Nothing, I argued, was more dangerous; American-Chinese autarky would inevitably lead to growing hostility between the two superpowers by weakening the mutual incentive to cooperate.
There was a further, unspoken point in that piece: any time two superpowers drift apart, the international rules become blurred, and rival geopolitical camps become more likely. Of course, realignments like this are never absolute, and it is perfectly possible (and very common) for medium to smallish countries to hedge their bets. But realities of economics, geography, military threat, and culture are what they are, and when faced with a changing, polarizing world, governments face a powerful incentive to choose a single ‘geopolitical harbor,’ as it were. We saw this most famously in the Cold War, with the world loosely dividing itself into ‘First,’ ‘Second,’ and ‘Third’ Worlds.
Allow me a bit more build up.
The geopolitical order at any given time is a delicate web of alliances, allegiances, and perceptions. Every government has a sense of their position on the world stage and a sense of the maneuverability that position allows them. On top of this, each government understands that there are certain international ‘rules’ and expectations; you do this and I’ll do that, etc. Some governments are satisfied with the status quo while others, for reasons big and/or small, are not. But the rules are not static, and perceptions change.
Last summer, the great choice for governments appeared to involve the U.S.-China rivalry: “how do we navigate this budding Cold War II?”
Now, the unfathomable has happened. A large-scale multi-front war blazes in Europe, despite the efforts and wishes of the liberal, Western, multilateral world order. Russia has generally been sluggish, bogged down by its worse-than-we-thought military. But all signs point to a drawn-out rock fight. The rhetoric has been explosive. The diplomatic repercussions are already permanent (looking at you Finland). And neither side feels that they can back down.
Now, the Russia-Ukraine War represents the great choice.
Governments have been forced to choose whether to participate in sanctions, whether to condemn Putin and his regime, and whether to restructure their economic foundations. This series of choices has sharply divided the world, greatly exacerbating former divisions and forging new ones. After years of tense but largely cordial relations, the entire Western world has declared Russia an outlaw. NATO has gone from a seemingly anachronistic relic to an exceedingly relevant blood pact. Maybe the UN Security Council is the relic now. Japan and Germany are shaking off the ghosts of the past and remilitarizing.
In short, the old geopolitical web is frayed, and a new one must be spun in its place.
This is not just a Western affair either. All corners of the world are being affected by these geopolitical and moral realignments. For India and China, the Ukraine invasion is a moment of great opportunity. So far, they have both been noncommittal on condemning or punishing Russia, yet both claim to occupy a sort of moral middle-ground, offering a reasonable alternative to Moscow and Washington. Certainly, India and China are watching the reaction of the West and the efficacy of sanctions very closely. Both countries are led by highly ambitious and historically-conscious men with their own territorial grievances – before long, they will likely seek to exploit the rare circumstances brought on by the war.
On a smaller scale, similar calculations are being made in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South America. Whether for economic, political, or moral aims (or all three), over the coming months governments in these regions will be reconsidering their expectations for the future – perhaps something can be gained from the new world order. As only one example, look at Qatar: already occupying a crucial position as a diplomatic mediator in the Middle East, in medium-term Qatar seems set to become a leading gas supplier for Europe, making up the Russian shortfall. How global politics will change when Europe (especially Germany) becomes dependent on Arab gas, it is too soon to say.
Beyond any of these considerations, everyone everywhere is feeling the economic pain caused by the war. Russia is a crucial supplier of food as well as energy, and markets everywhere are scrambling to cope with supply chain disruptions. Especially for the poorer regions of the world, this conflict is not about esoteric diplomatic maneuvers; it is about starvation and privation. Coming at a time of skyrocketing global inflation, no one knows where this pain might lead. But I suspect that the long-term damage caused by Russia’s geopolitical and economic displacement will fuel a series of low to medium flare-ups on the international margins for years to come.
In world history, there is the rare event that throws the whole international system out of balance. Sometimes, this is quite obvious and immediate; think WWI or the French Revolution. But it can also be more subdued and drawn out. Think of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Not many people know about it, barely anyone stills talks about it. But, to keep things extremely brief, it caused the unification of Germany and established the basic diplomatic conditions which eventually led to war in 1914. Read up on it sometime; it is fascinating, and it too frayed an old geopolitical web.
Unfortunately, less than a year after my autarky article, there is a new great danger on the horizon. There is nothing more dangerous than diffuse and jealous power, and Russia’s invasion has made that the order of the day. I really hope this doesn’t become an annual tradition.
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