International high tech innovation was once a project characterized by optimism and a belief in the possibility of mutual gain. This was part of a broader optimism that, in the main, characterized the discussion on globalization. Even in the twilight of the Obama years, it still seemed possible that global collaboration and multilateral dependence could solve the pressing problems of the day.
Perhaps that outlook was always a mirage, and in our nostalgia we remember an international placidity that never really existed.
But it is also true that national self-sufficiency has taken on a new, desperate importance in the world of high tech. As the importance and scale of high tech continues to expand, no one wants to rely too much on the technological infrastructure of other countries. Now, as governments pursue quantum computers, self-driving cars, and 5G networks, autarky is the order of the day.
More precisely, autarky is the order of the day for the United States and China, as both superpowers seek greater economic and technological independence from each other. This is not to say that competition hasn’t always existed; it has, and fierce national interest has always been a factor in how China and America do business. But there was usually a general political ease about how much the two countries relied on one another.
In the wake of Trump’s trade war, the battles over Huawei 5G, the 2025 Made in China initiative, and the recently passed $250 billion industry subsidies bill, it is clear that the United States and China are furiously attempting to disentangle the economic and technological ties that bind them.
This is broadly true for all areas of economic life, but nowhere is dependency more nightmarish than with high tech. Both superpowers believe that a reliance on the technology or supply chains of the other invites sabotage and espionage. With the flick of a switch whole power grids might go offline. Entire sectors of transportation could be forced to a halt. And the private data of individual citizens, an increasingly critical resource, could be stolen out the back door.
These fears might be exaggerations. But they are also based in technological realities and recent patterns of state behavior.
Many analysts have pointed to the relationship between Japan and the U.S in the 1980s as an earlier example of U.S technological paranoia. But in the big picture, it is more useful to look to the eve of WWI for clues on the present situation. Back then, self-reliance in industry and technology also defined the geopolitics of superpowers. The players were different than they are now, but the situation was largely the same. In the early 20th century, globalization was on the rise and international economic integration increased year over year. And yet, coalitions of nations looked at each with deep suspicion, always fearing and preparing for the worst. Individual countries were convinced that their rivals were plotting their downfall, and as a result specific industries and resources had to be protected and improved at all costs. This desire for autarky is part of what drove the colonialism of the age; European countries were all chasing the illusion of total self-sufficiency.
This imbued diplomacy with hostility and paranoia. Foreign policy choices big and small were seen through an adversarial lens. And more than anything else, leaders everywhere feared falling behind. When that happened, surely all would be lost.
It is always dangerous to draw direct parallels in history. Much has changed, much is different. But I see the U.S-China relationship proceeding on a similar path, with the E.U caught somewhere awkwardly in the middle.
To an extent, it makes sense for the U.S to pursue self-reliance. Recent policy moves are in no small part driven by a desire to sponsor growth and jobs at home; both are worthy ends. More importantly, we have tangible evidence that China is willing to use its high tech maliciously, as the recent instances of election interference and bullying over Hong Kong illustrate. Meanwhile, it cannot be denied that the U.S is at least partially hostile to some of the actions of the Chinese government, nor is it unusual for the U.S to use economic means to exert political pressure if the need arises.
Despite these good intentions, I worry that the desire to promote national high tech industries and cut out unfriendly rivals will destabilize the international order.
It is a well-established fact, after all, that economic interdependence is the primary safeguard against war. As long as China and America remain technologically intertwined, neither would seek outright conflict. They might meddle and prod, but never anything more. In contrast, what exactly would a world with two separate, self-sufficient, and mutually suspicious superpowers look like? Would this be a bulwark for peace?
Truthfully, I don’t know what the alternative looks like, and realistically neither side is in much of a position to seek closer bilateral ties - the political tailwinds and strategic incentives are too strong. In the presence of a terrifying enemy, the drive to self-sufficiency has always had a seductive appeal; once begun, it can be nearly impossible to arrest.
China and America have both set down the path to autarky. The machinery of a great, gradual detachment has begun to spin and grind. There is no more important geopolitical phenomenon in the world today. And we must watch the next few years carefully as a result.
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