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  • Writer's pictureLaurence Claussen

Twelve Years of Change in the Middle East

Recently, I’ve wanted to write a piece about the Middle East. But what to write about? What country should I focus on? And even if I picked a country, what headline or crisis should I examine? This general musing took me down a rabbit hole, back through the years of the 2010s, back through all that has happened in this ever-eventful region. Eventually I realized what I wanted to write about: since 2010 no other region of the world has seen as much generational change as the Middle East.


since 2010 no other region of the world has seen as much generational change as the Middle East.

Seriously, just think about some of the stuff that has happened.


There have been great 1848-style uprisings and revolutions, most notably of course the Arab Spring of 2010-2012, which gripped almost every country in the region. Some of these revolutions were followed by reformed systems of governance, most were followed by authoritarian backsliding – but all brought new ideas to the surface and established a precedent for civil resistance and revolution.


As the old American conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan faded, new civil wars, international wars, and proxy wars broke out – indeed, the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen have been some version of all three. The Middle East’s refugees radically altered the politics in Europe and brought the two regions into more intimate and uncomfortable interaction. The Islamic State, a terrifying and ruthless pseudo-country, rose and (mostly) fell with the span of a few years. Great powers have bickered and jostled over questions of economic and geopolitical domination, while at the same time the United States has awkwardly tried to extricate itself from over a decade of failed Middle East policies. The Iran nuclear pact promised a new era of cooperation before swiftly collapsing. New relationships have been forged (Israel and Qatar) and old relationships appear broken (Saudi Arabia and the USA?).


All of the above is still being played out, so it’s hard to pin down what form the ‘generational change’ will ultimately take. Indeed, the outcomes and legacies involved will take decades to reveal themselves. On top of this, one might argue that the whole world is gripped by accelerating hurricanes of change –is the Middle East really that special?


Well, ok fair enough. But for one, as the first ever Arab World Cup begins, I think it’s as good a time as any to take stock of the region. And secondly, while comparing the ‘extent of change’ across regions is admittedly a treacherous and mostly pointless exercise, I do think that the Middle East has been uniquely tumultuous since 2010. More importantly, the causes of this tumult are broadly informative, because they tell us something about the traps and skeleton keys involved in 21st century geopolitics.


In this piece, I will describe five mini case studies. They come in no particular order and were chosen without any particular method. But I find that each tells a compelling story. And depending on how things shake out, each will likely define the next decade of change in the Middle East.


Let’s start with Israel. In recent years, Israeli domestic politics and foreign politics seem to be heading in opposite directions. Domestically, the country’s democratic system is in a state of low-burning crisis. Since April 2019 there have been five national legislative elections, as no faction or coalition is able to rule the country in a steady and stable manner. Israel’s longest serving prime minister and noted political wizard Benjamin Netanyahu has been embroiled in corruption allegations, and after a brief stint out of power he is (potentially) back in thanks to the elections on November 1. In this most recent election, Netanyahu has been helped by far-right politicians, some of whom are self-styled homophobes who support Arab-Israeli segregation. The Middle East’s most vibrant democracy appears to be on a dangerous path, and its not at all clear how its pluralistic government will function if men like Bezalel Smotrich take a leading role.


At the same time, Israel’s foreign policy is scoring big wins. Recent deals with Lebanon, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have opened new economic and diplomatic avenues. Together, they seem to suggest that a stable Arab-Israel equilibrium is possible. And its noteworthy that all these deals were reached without flashy foreign interventions and summits at Camp David, but through hard, multilateral negotiation, subtle international facilitation, and a mutual commitment to peaceful coexistence. Perhaps there is a workable path here that might be followed with the rest of the Arab world? Looking ahead to the next twelve years, I think it is entirely possible that Israel will have workable and improving relations with all of its neighbors. But that will depend on whether it finds its footing at home and resists the more provocative elements of its electorate.


From Israel, let us turn to Iran. Since the death of the 22-year-old woman Mahsa Amini in mid-September, liberal protests led mostly by women have enveloped the nation. These protests are loosely organized and geographically disperse, but they are united by a deep frustration with Iran’s oppressive Islamic regime and the lack of civil and political rights. And while the most likely outcome is that these protests will eventually dissolve in the face of withering government crackdowns, they are a powerful reminder that the Iranian people do desire greater freedoms and still hold revolutionary potential. As Shadi Hamid recently pointed out in The Atlantic, the 1979 revolution occurred because of specific conditions – namely, pent-up fears and frustrations towards an oppressive regime – yet the process of replacing that regime has led to a similar set of conditions.


I’ve long believed that Iran is a much more cosmopolitan and liberal country than its government suggests, a position arrived at mostly through long conversations with Iranian friends. Who knows, maybe the Mahsa Amini protests are the seed of a second revolution? Maybe Iran will be totally transformed during the next twelve years? And if it is, maybe it will prove a much more attractive ally for the West than the other authoritarian Middle Eastern behemoth…


Saudi Arabia is an interesting case because it seems set on a course that will inevitability lead to a permanent breach with Washington. The brutal murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, coupled with the swaggering power grabs by the Saudi Crown Prince and the troubling war in Yemen, have made it increasingly difficult for Western countries to justify close relations with Riyadh. Now, as global energy markets roil in the wake of the Russia Ukraine war, Saudi and OPEC efforts to tighten the supply of oil and gas have deeply offended President Biden. His administration even posed the question: “Is the nature of the relationship serving the interest and values of the United States and what changes would make it better serve the interests and values?” Certainly, part of this is just frustrated bluster, and the US is unlikely to shove off Saudi Arabia any time soon. But the Obama, Trump, and now Biden administrations have all made subtle moves to untangle some of the ties that bind the two countries. And as Washington drifts away, perhaps Saudi rulers will seek a new ally, an ally with less scruples and a similarly bottomless appetite for energy. Any takers?


Next, I want to focus on Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, three countries that have been (or still are) the site of major proxy and civil wars. Of course, these countries’ situations are far from identical: Iraq is pretty much at peace and has a new, mostly legitimate government in place after a year of political tension; Syria’s seemingly endless civil war is still ongoing, although the world seems to have moved on; and Yemen is also still at war, despite major international efforts to secure a months-long truce earlier this year. The reason I have these three countries grouped together is that they have seen the most violence and upheaval over the last decade, and together they represent the main obstacle towards meaningful peace and human progress in the region as a whole. How and when war is put aside and how and when these societies are rebuilt (including which factions come out on top) will determine the conflicts of the next generation, as well as the nature of the ongoing Iran-Saudi rivalry.


Last and maybe in fact least, there is the question of Afghanistan. In a way, Afghanistan suggests the opposite of ‘generational change’; here is a country that seems to be going backwards. But deterioration is its own kind of change, and ever since the chaotic American withdrawal of August 2021 Afghanistan has been one long running humanitarian disaster. At the time of the withdrawal, I wrote that the United States needed to get more involved in its diplomatic and humanitarian efforts, and not succumb to the understandable temptation to put the whole blasted mess behind it. Since then, the US government has mostly remained engaged, but finds itself lacking leverage to actually get a lot done. Indeed, as the United States Institute of Peace recently documented, the tools available for dealing with Taliban leaders are limited and inflexible. Accordingly, it is hard to see how the situation will get any better without another forceful intervention, and for obvious reasons that is probably off the table for a long while.


Looking ahead, this situation poses unique dangers. As the Taliban regime descends into its familiar corruption and decrepitude, it is possible that new threats and terrorist groups will rise, disturbing the local geopolitical balance, dragging foreign countries back into armed conflict, and bringing harm to the international community. Accordingly, the world must remain vigilant as it continues trying to help the Afghan people.


So, what are the geopolitical takeaways of all this? What might we glean from twelve years of change? As I see it, there are three main conclusions one should draw from this discussion:


1. Geopolitics is not an abstract thing. While it is easy to dismiss shadowy rivalries and great power machinations as the stuff of high politics, and therefore distant from the lived realities of the people, I think the Middle East proves that such dynamics really do affect the material and social realities of citizens. How rivals interact and what great powers choose to do can cause one country to collapse (as with Yemen) while another achieves cautious progress (as with Iraq). Of course, any such outcome is enormously complex and multicausal. But nonetheless we must hold our governments accountable and always remember that abstract decisions often have tangible consequences.


2. Tactical disengagement and diplomacy really can work. Sometimes, when the cameras of the world are on an issue, neither side is incentivized to compromise. It might take a public ‘walking away’ followed by a side-door return for Western countries to exert meaningful influence. And even then, diplomatic breakthroughs can only ever happen when the actual countries involved take the lead. The recent string of Israeli diplomatic successes certainly points to this, suggesting that even apparently intractable tensions can ease given the right combination of circumstances. These developments should encourage Western leaders to continue to promote peaceful compromises around the world, so long as they move quietly.


3. We never know when the next big historic moment is upon us. Ok so this takeaway is a little vague, but perhaps it is the most important. Sometimes, we don’t know we’re living through a historic watershed until its almost complete. Sometimes, what feels like a historic watershed turns out to be a sputtering disappointment. Accordingly, policymakers and commentators alike should always proceed with a healthy dose of humility, as well as enough mental flexibility to embrace even distant possibilities. That will not and cannot guarantee perfect outcomes, but it certainly won’t hurt our collective chances.


The whole world is changing rapidly, and perhaps nowhere more so than the Middle East. There are opportunities and pitfalls everywhere – in the next twelve years we might see a revolution of peace and human rights in Iran, and we might see the worst humanitarian disasters on the planet. Meanwhile, the world continues to attempt a green energy transition in its fight against climate change, guaranteeing that the Middle East will remain a major area of geopolitical and economic attention. And as the Russian government continues to fall down the hole it has flung itself into, it is plausible that we will see even more vacuums form as the traditional geopolitical pressure from the north eases.


Ultimately, I have no idea what the Middle East is going to look like in another twelve years – except that it won’t look anything like it does today.

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