This week, it seems inappropriate to write about anything other than Afghanistan. The events surrounding the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and especially the images it produced are shocking. This catastrophe recalls earlier decades, earlier wars. Vietnam, the Balkans, Iraq. These conflicts may have been fading from public consciousness, but Afghanistan brought them screaming back. And now people everywhere are reflecting on the broader morality and feasibility of foreigner-led nation-building. Moreover, policymakers and historians (or simply those interested in such questions) will undoubtedly be straining to think about how Afghanistan could’ve turned out differently. With 20-20 hindsight, many now insist that it was a lost cause all along.
The other major part of this story is the Biden administration. While no reasonable commentator would blame Biden for the failure of the overall mission, many do blame the administration for how the specifics of the American withdrawal were managed. Americans on both sides of the aisle feel angry and embarrassed. And it doesn’t help that foreign newspapers immediately cast the Kabul debacle as merely one act in a long history of failed American interventions. Biden has since defended his choices leading up to Kabul, stressing that he was honoring an agreement made by the previous administration; even Republicans acknowledge that Trump was probably just as eager to get out as Biden. Without recourse to pure partisanship, it is therefore difficult to lay the blame for the withdrawal disaster squarely at the feet of this White House. But in the last six months, mistakes were clearly made, either regarding intelligence or logistics or both.
In any case, the optics are not good, and this week Biden’s approval rating dipped below 50% for the first time.
All of this, however, has been written about ad nauseum. Far less talked about, I think, are the geopolitical implications of the new Afghanistan, and the need for Western countries to retool and reengage. Allow me to unpack this admittedly vague assertion.
While the West is rightfully focusing on the immediate problem of evacuating Kabul and monitoring human rights abuses, we must not lose sight of the bigger picture. Thomas Friedman, in a Monday article, articulated this idea well: “when big events happen [in the Middle East], always distinguish between the morning after and the morning after the morning after.” For Transatlantic policymakers, that means facing the geopolitical realities of the new status quo. Because at the moment, Afghanistan is a diplomatic Wild West. America, like the movie cowboy of old, rides off wounded into the sunset, never to return. Now various neighboring powers and non-state actors are sure to come riding in, loaded with ammo and coffee, in an attempt to fill the void.
Pakistan and India, for example, will likely clash over the issue of the Afghan border. The Afghan-Pakistani border has been a subject of dispute since the late 19th century, when British civil servant Mortimer Durand drew a line that left large numbers of Pashtuns (the most numerous ethnic group in Afghanistan) detached from their brethren. Looking ahead, Pakistan will want to preserve a peaceful border and prevent any redrawing of the map, allowing its government to focus more intently on Kashmir. India, wanting to solidify its control over Kashmir, wants a chaotic and troublesome Afghan border to divide Pakistani attention.
Iran, meanwhile, will be very interested in safeguarding the sizeable Hazara minority, a Persian-speaking ethnic group who live primarily in western Afghanistan. This might drag them into conflict with Taliban forces, a conflict which the newly resurgent arch-conservative Irani government might want as a distraction from domestic woes.
To the north, Russia and the bordering ‘Stans’ (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) will have immense economic incentive to secure lucrative deals with the Taliban. Likewise, the Taliban might look to these countries as a source of economic refuge since most of the rest of the world looks certain to shut its doors to the new Afghanistan. We should never underestimate Putin’s capacity for geopolitical mischief – nor his desire to avenge Russian pride. And although a ‘second Soviet invasion’ is extremely unlikely, Moscow might yet try to bring Afghanistan back into a Russian orbit.
Then there’s China. Friedman bears mention here too, because he correctly pointed out yesterday that the ongoing American occupation was ideal for Xi Jinping. With American security forces and money in place, Chinese contractors and investors could scour the land for opportunities without having to worry about the messy business of holding it all together. Moreover, the occupation kept America distracted from the broader competition with China. Now, if China wants to benefit from Afghanistan, they have to take on more risk. Overall, then, the American withdrawal is not an obvious victory for Beijing. But in the context of the Belt-and-Road initiative, and China’s ongoing purchase of Pakistan, Afghanistan remains tempting. If the Taliban somehow pull off a national-unity government, and China bankrolls a reconstruction of the country, the strategic and propaganda value would be tremendous.
Finally, we cannot forget the various non-state forces in the region. Al-Qaeda might come crawling back, looking to recover old strongholds. Alternatively, new groups and factions could emerge. Perhaps a small delegation of Uyghur representatives will come to town, hungry for more extreme forms of resistance against Chinese oppression – so far, all overtures to the West have fallen on deaf ears. Now, this specific situation is purely speculative. But it is important than we remember how quickly new political movements and extremist groups can coalesce in this corner of the world, especially given the right circumstances. And at this very moment, thousands of former Afghan soldiers are fleeing to neighboring countries. At the moment they lack any unifying cause, but this could soon change.
The point is this. Across the Middle East and Central Asia, many are looking at the new Afghanistan as a land of opportunity, a place to bury grievances and sharpen knives. And despite all the humiliation and fear, despite our sense of lost blood and treasure, the West cannot now abandon Afghanistan.
The urge to do so is great. Right now, the West is withdrawing, physically and emotionally. Most American and European policymakers don’t want to touch the Afghan issue with a ten-foot pole. I understand the instinct, no one wants to return to the battlefield, and after twenty years it may feel like there’s nothing left to do but cut and run. But neither can we wash our hands of the past and ignore the place left behind.
If we truly care about the women and children of Afghanistan, and about the country as a whole, we must engage more, not less. We must engage not by flexing Western might and sending in the drones, but by wielding Western influence and sending in diplomats, humanitarians, and on-the-ground observers. Policymakers have to face the challenge before them, starting with recognizing the dangers of complete disengagement. Remaining on the sidelines, scandalized by the whole affair, is not responsible politics. We must secure a seat at the table and lobby constantly – with the Taliban and through our allies – for a more peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. Offer incentives, cut deals, undermine rivals. Only messy, local politicking and realistic negotiation can accomplish what warfare and occupation could not.
This will not be easy, and it is likely to fail. Indeed, we should not delude ourselves on our ability to change the world. But we must try. Otherwise, Afghanistan’s only value will be as a graveyard to our rivals. Otherwise, we ensure that all the blood has truly been for naught.