One of Brexit’s infamous consequences has been a weakening of the Union.
Scotland, after voting to remain in the UK back in 2014, now seems poised to request a second referendum on the basis of reentering the EU; this has been dubbed ‘IndyRef2.’ Polling is inconclusive on whether the majority of Scots favor independence, but support grew steadily since 2016 and the Scottish Nationalists are currently the most powerful political faction. Boris Johnson has the power to refuse IndyRef2, but it might be politically awkward for such a pro-referendum figure to do so. At the very least, Brexit has guaranteed that the issue of Scottish Independence won’t go away for years. In normal circumstances, after 2014, it should have submerged for at least a generation.
Perhaps even more ominously (or auspiciously), Irish unification seems to be gaining momentum. Northern Ireland was always the most difficult element of the Brexit negotiations. And keeping with the traditional geopolitical approach to intransigent issues (see history of Israel-Palestinian treaties), it is clear that the negotiated solution hasn’t satisfied anyone. Northern Ireland, in its current legal state vis-à-vis the EU, is detached from the rest of the UK in a way it never really has been. In a post-Brexit world, trade and migration across the Irish sea will always be problematic. Considering this alongside the steady progress made by Northern Irish nationalists (who are in favor of reunification with the South) and the demographic reality of a growing Catholic population it is safe to assume that a referendum on Irish reunification will be held this decade. Still, a comfortable majority of Northern Irish favor union with Britain, so things are far from certain.
To reiterate, I am not saying that Scottish independence and Irish reunification are going to happen. No one can predict that. However, it is undeniable that Brexit has woken and fueled separatist forces across the country, giving previously dormant movements new life.
It might not lead to anything. But, if nothing else, the 2010s should have taught us that politics can change in sudden, almost unbelievable ways within single election cycles.
These recent developments obviously have long, intricate histories that predate Brexit by several centuries. But I think there are broader implications here, beyond the specifics of British history. I think the case of Britain demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining a federal government in 21st century Europe outside of the EU.
As I see it, there is an optimistic and cynical reason for why the EU promotes unity in federal states.
For context, there are only three formal federations in the EU: Austria, Belgium, and Germany. Moreover, Italy and Spain, while technically not federal systems, are devolved states with significant internal divisions and local identity movements. (Spain, of course, is the European poster child of separatist movements.) So, only five out of twenty-seven member states are federal or near-federal. Those five countries, however, have roughly 211,360,000 people, almost half of the entire EU population. Outside of the EU these countries would not, in all likelihood, implode; but they would probably find it significantly more difficult to maintain successful cohesion and prosperity between their respective constituent parts.
The optimistic reason is that the free flow of goods and people helps maintain a basic comfort and ease in all its member states. The EU does, after all, provide lucrative and targeted subsidies in areas that don’t usually receive much funding, such as agricultural communities and rural road building. Once the EU tap runs dry, as it has for Scotland and Northern Ireland, local economic and social asymmetries become more pronounced. Of course, the EU does not solve all inequities. But it might, by its very construction, benefit certain national regions more than others, thereby leveling the playing field somewhat. Generally, locals want autonomy when times get tough, when citizens experience a loss of confidence in distant authorities. To the European optimist, then, the economic costs of leaving the EU would prompt disunity and calls for autonomy within federal systems.
The cynical reason is that the EU is the ultimate scapegoat. Local political energies and concerns will always exist. There will always be grounds to agitate for greater privileges or autonomy. But so long as the EU exists as a supranational state, these energies will be primarily exercised against the distant and vague authority of Brussels, rather than the country’s own government. So long as a federation exists inside the EU, its internal unity will appear comparatively strong. Demands for reform or restructuring can be redirected against the bureaucratic status quo of the larger body. In this sense, the EU serves as a peculiar lightning rod. It attracts the lightning of separatism from across a continent, leaving federal policymakers everywhere sleeping a little easier.
the EU serves as a peculiar lightning rod.
Which of these arguments is closer to reality is besides the point. What matters is that Brexit has revealed dramatic weaknesses in Britain's federal system. It is dangerous to infer causality from this; it is wrong to claim, for example, that the UK only stayed united because of the EU. But it is proper to consider what invisible or underappreciated European forces helped contribute to the UK's cohesion. Only then can we sufficiently understand the EU's general influence on European political life.
More broadly, projects like the EU demand constant reflection and evaluation. We need to ask ourselves where its value truly lies if we are to fix its shortcomings and move into the future. As stupid and destructive as Brexit has been, it has provided a unique opportunity for just such reflection. If we're lucky, the conclusions that result may make our governments more effective, more democratic and more responsive for the decades ahead.
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