In the summer of 2016 I went to a Democratic Party campaign event in Berlin. It was exciting to be there, talking politics with the pros. But I left feeling troubled. Everyone echoed the same sentiment: Hillary Clinton, our next president, Trump, an irrelevant aberration, and by November ‘business as usual.'
Back then, it seemed to me that no one took the possibility of a great disruption seriously. No one doubted that precedent would prevail. Trump was so unimaginable, that it wasn’t worth imagining his victory. ‘Hmmm,’ I told my dad as we walked home from the event, ‘I sure hope that this isn’t the general attitude of the Democratic party, because nobody seemed to worry about fighting to win.’
Trump’s eventual victory (and subsequent Democratic dismay) crystalized the lesson of the summer campaign event: don’t take politics for granted, don’t assume things will work out as they always have.
Flash forward.
It is 2021, the year of the German national election. Context and circumstances have made this election unlike any other in German memory. The grande dame of modern German politics is stepping aside. There is a once-in-a-century pandemic wreaking havoc. Climate change knocks on Europe’s doors with floods and fires. And the three major party candidates – Armin Laschet of the Christian Democrats (CDU), Annalena Baerbock of the Greens, and Olaf Scholz of the Social Democrats (SPD) – are more or less unsatisfying.
From these unusual conditions emerge unusual forecasts. The highest polling party is projected at 26% (SPD), the second highest at 21% (CDU) and the third at 16% (Greens). After that, there are two parties polling at 11% (the pro-business FDP and the far-right AfD) and a final party at 6% (the Leftists).
In the thirty years of German elections since reunification, there has never been such a dispersion of electoral support. Normally, the CDU and SPD swallow up around 55-60% of the vote. This year, they look set to receive 47%.
Accordingly, this election is proving difficult to predict. Most commentary has focused on the relative merits of the three main candidates, trying to guess just who will come out on top on election day (September 26th).
But let’s take a step back for a moment, crane our necks, and try to look past the vote.
The post-election coalition-building process – a staple of German politics – doesn’t get as much coverage. It is talked about, but usually only insofar as people trade theories about which coalitions might happen and which they prefer. Germans even have cute names for the different party combinations, based on party colors. For example, ‘Jamaica’ is black (CDU), green (Greens) & yellow (FDP); the ‘Streetlight’ is red (SPD), FDP, & Greens; a ‘Germany’ is CDU-SPD-FDP, after the German flag, and so on.
Amidst such talk, no one doubts that some coalition will eventually be formed. Everyone knows it will be difficult. The last coalition negotiations, after the 2017 election, took six months; back then, an initial ‘Jamaica’ coalition agreement collapsed and was replaced by a ‘Grand Coalition' (CDU-SPD).
Today, most assume that some version of 2017 will repeat itself. Negotiations will be long, hard, and tedious, but in the end it will be business as usual come Spring.
Ehh, I’m not so sure.
If current electoral numbers hold, a coalition simply might not be possible. If the numbers hold, the old, safe option of a Grand Coalition (which both CDU and SPD are sick of anyway) wouldn’t muster more than 50%. The Greens have spoken so much about Germany striking a new path that they might well not want to join as a third partner – surely it would be far better for the Greens to let the CDU and SPD flame out, and then step into the breach? Even if the CDU does better than expected, can they really form a government with a mere 25% of the vote? Meanwhile, the FDP are comfortable with the CDU but probably incompatible with both the SPD and Greens. And without a good, three meter long pole, no one wants to touch the AfD, while the Leftists are always controversial. Through it all the pandemic continues to inflame divisions and disagreements. Oh, and a brewing SPD financial scandal seems to be picking up steam.
If the current electoral numbers hold, a coalition simply might not be possible.
This mess makes 2017 look like a walk in the park.
Still, Germans trust their laws. The German constitution mandates that a government must be formed after an election – it just gives no specific deadline. If coalition talks are protracted, the previous Chancellor and Cabinet remain in power as an ‘acting government’ until such a time when a new coalition is formed. Technically, if the new Chancellor amasses less than 50% of the Bundestag (Parliament) vote, then the German president could dissolve the Bundestag and call for new elections within 60 days.
A repeat election will almost certainly not happen. But what if Merkel has to stick around as acting Chancellor for six, eight, or ten months? What happens if the only possible government is a weak minority government of the SPD and Greens? Will the constituent parties be fatally weakened as a result? Can Germany meet the challenges of the day under a minority government? Will voter frustration with the whole coalition process empower the political extremes?
I have no idea what is going to happen after September 26th. But there are several potential crises lurking under the surface. Certainly, the German political landscape is hurtling towards a tectonic shift, where the old balance of power is entirely up for grabs. And such crises and shifts will not be obvious on election night – they will arise in the ‘then what?’ phase of politics.
Don’t take politics for granted, don’t assume things will work out as they always have.
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